Using Kuwaiti data, this study examined the relationship between the concentration and composition of ownership and the performance of firms. In the study, we estimated and examined this relationship using ordinary least squares (OLS) for a sample of 130 Kuwaiti firms listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) from 2009 to 2012. The overall concentration of ownership by large shareholders showed no impact on firms' performance. However, when the type of large shareholders was introduced, only the concentrations of government ownership and families' (individuals) ownership influenced firms' performance. Therefore, not all concentrations of ownership among large shareholders are useful to listed Kuwaiti firms.
INTRODUCTION
and Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that the separation of ownership and control has created conflicts between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents). Shareholders seek to maximize the firm's value, while managers promote their own interests and benefits. To resolve this conflict of interest and reduce the costs associated with it, several mechanisms of corporate governance, such as ownership structure, have been introduced. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) stated that ownership structure is an important component of corporate governance. In this study, we examined the effects of ownership structure on firms' performance in Kuwait and focused on the role of the two main dimensions of ownership structure, ownership concentration (the distribution of shares owned by large shareholders) and ownership composition (institutional investors, government investors, and individual investors).
There are two types of ownership structure: dispersed and concentrated. When ownership is dispersed, as in most UK and US listed firms, agency conflict of interests arise between shareholders and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
However, when ownership is concentrated, as is typical in developing countries, large shareholders own the majority of firm's shares and control the voting rights, the main agency problem in this case is not between managers and shareholders, as in the case of widely listed firms, but is between strong large shareholders and minority shareholders.
Thus, it is imperative to study the type of ownership structure to determine the nature of agency problems and identify which parties dominate the conflicts of interests in order to solve the agency problem.
Despite the substantial number of studies on ownership structure, additional empirical evidence of ownership structure and firms' performance from a different environment can still enhance our understanding of the mechanisms of corporate governance. There are substantial differences in the institutional characteristics and legal systems of developed countries and developing countries (La Porta et al, 1997 . The major contribution of this study is that it extended the knowledge of the concentration and composition of ownership of listed firms in a developing country, such as Kuwait, which is currently in the process of developing corporate governance. An Empirical study could help in examining the nature of ownership structure and assist the Kuwaiti government in the developing regulations. Also, this study could help firms listed on the KSE and investors understand the impacts of large groups of shareholders on firms' performance, including those groups that may have positive impacts on firms' performance and those that may have negative impacts on firms' performance.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section two outlines Kuwait's background. Section three reviews the literature on the relationship between ownership structure and firms' performance, which also includes the theoretical framework of this study, previous studies, and the development of hypotheses. Section four presents the research method used in the study. Section five discusses the results, and section six presents the implication of the findings. Finally, section seven presents our conclusions.
Kuwait's Background
In September 1984, the KSE opened a new trading system to investors; it exists independently, with the right to make and pursue rules to maximize its efficiency. The rights. La Porta et al (1999) stated that the main agency problem in developing countries is the conflict between large shareholders and minority shareholders-a problem that might be more serious in firms that ignore minority shareholders' rights and create corporate governance problems in terms of firms' performance.
Empirically, Omran et al (2008) studied the concentration of ownership in four Arab countries and found that high market uncertainty has resulted in firms having high levels of ownership. Alfaraih et al. (2012) studied the ownership structure in 2010 in Kuwait and found that the concentration of ownership by institutions was 55%, whereas the concentration of the government's ownership was 3%. Also, l-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2009) reported it to be about 55%. This study identified four major categories of ownership in Kuwait, i.e., institutional investors, government, families (individuals), and large numbers of minority shareholders.
Previous studies and the development of hypotheses
Since the studies of Berle and Means (1932) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Grossman and Hart, 1980) . Table 2 shows that empirical studies have had mixed results. For example, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , Denis and Denis (1994) , Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , Holderness and Sheehan (1988), and Prowse (1992) Nickell et al (1997) in the UK, Erhardt et al. (2006) in Germany, Earle et al (2005) in Hungary, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) in Greece, Claessens and Djankov (1999) performance, but, consistent with the theoretical argument, we expected firms that had higher concentrations of institutional investors to perform better.
H2: A positive relationship exists between the concentration of institutional ownership and firms'
performance.
La Porta et al. (1998 and Table 3 presents the sample used in the study. The dependent variable is firms' performance. Tobin's Q and return on assets (ROA) were used in this study. These indicators have also been used in previous studies, as presented previously in Table 2 . Two measures were used for firms' performance since no consensus exists in the literature for measuring firms' performance, and each measure has its own advantages and disadvantages (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou, 2007) . Also, a range of variables related to firms' performance was identified; these variables were selected as control variables in the regressions.
First, the firm-size variable was included to control for size differences across firms and to take into account the wellknown size effect. Second, firm age was used because firms can be considered reputable based on their knowledge and expertise. Third, debt ratio was used because a significant body of literature has identified it as a strong mechanism for solving the agency problem because it can prevent managers from investing in value-destroying projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Finally, industry dummies were used to account for any impact on the industry by characteristics that might impact firm' performance in Kuwait, such as growth, capital intensity, and others. Table 4 summarizes the operationalisation f the variables. Percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions that own more than 5% to the total shares 4 The researcher also used several variables such as the proportion of non executive directors, board size, role duality, and family directors as control variables. However, they were excluded from the models in the study because they made the results less powerful.
Variables Operationalisation

Governmen t ownership (GOC)
Percentage of shares outstanding held by government that owns more than 5% to the total shares In this study, we examined the relationship between large shareholders' concentration of ownership and firms'
performance. Also, in order to provide a deeper understanding of this relationship, we divided the concentration of ownership into three shareholder groups, i.e., institutional investors, government, and family (individual) investors. Thus, the following regression models were constructed:
Model 1:
Model 2:
where:
PM is the firms' performance represented by TQ and ROA.
OC is all large shareholders that own more than 5%.
IOC is the institutional ownership that owns more than 5%.
GOC is the government ownership that owns more than 5%.
FOC is families (individuals) ownership hat own more than 5%.
DT is the debt ratio.
FS is total assets of firm.
FA is the firm's age.
IN1 represents the dummy variable for the real estate industry.
IN2 represents the dummy variable for the manufacturing industry.
IN3 represents the dummy variable for the services industry.
As multi-regression was used to test the study's hypotheses, and the OLS assumptions, i.e., multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, linearity, autocorrelation, and normality, also should be tested. Several techniques were used to address the implications of these problems.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive analyses Table 5 presents the correlations among the independent variables. The highest correlation coefficient was 0.76 (between IOC and OC). Thus, it was not sufficient to impair the regression results since the pair-wise correlation coefficients were less than 0.80 (Gujarati, 2003; Judge et al., 1985) . Another method that has been used extensively to detect multicollinearity is the variance inflation factor (VIF), which is reported in Tables 7 and 8 . VIF did not exceed 10 for any variable in any model, so collinearity was not a serious problem (Brooks, 2002; Gujarati, 2003) . Table 5 also shows that government ownership concentration (GOC) and control variables affected firms' performance based on Tobin's Q, whereas large shareholders' ownership concentration by families (individuals) affected firms' performance, as did debt (DT) based on ROA. The sample includes 130 non financial listed firms on Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) over the period from 2009 to 2012 continuously. Tobin: Ratio of market value of a firm's equity (the firm's share price at the end of the year multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding) + total debt/the book value of total assets; ROA= This ratio is calculated as earned before interest and taxes divided by total assets; OC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by the largest shareholders who own more than 5% of the total equity; IOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions that own more than 5% to the total shares ; GOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by government that own more than 5% to the total shares ; FOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by families (individuals) that own more than 5% to the total shares; Control variables: DT: total debt divided by assets; FS: firm's size measured by total assets; FA: firm's age measured by number of years since incorporation * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
The analysis of the skewness and kurtosis of the tests ( Gujarati (2003) argued that data are said to be normal if standard kurtosis is within ±3 and standard skewness is within ±1.96. 6 The normal score are achieved by dividing the number of observations by the distribution plus one region, on the basis that each region has equal probability. Also, to test normality, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test (K-S Lilliefors) was conducted. K-S (Lilliefors) with significance of > 0.05 indicates normality.
randomly around a horizontal line through zero. Therefore, the graphs revealed that OLS assumptions were not violated.
7 Table 6 presents the descriptive analysis for all variables.
For dependent variables, the Tobin's Q performance measure generated a mean value of 1.3 (minimum = 0.10, maximum = 9.1). Table 6 also demonstrates that the ROA had a huge deviation among Kuwaiti firms, i.e., the mean performance was 4%, with a maximum of 37% and a minimum of -66%. 7 SSPS 18.0 was used for the statistical analysis and for transforming data into normal scores. The researcher also performed the analysis using natural logarithmic transformation, but the results were less accurate and useful than those of normal scores transformation. The researcher used a book published by Bryman and Cramer (1997) .
Al-Shammari and
For independent variables, the mean value for ownership concentration in the sample period was 56% (minimum = 0%; maximum = 97%). This was greater than the concentration of ownership in developed countries. This finding was very close to the finding of Alfaraih et al. (2012) in their 2010 study of the ownership structure in Kuwait in which they found that the concentration of ownership by institutions was 55%. Also, Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan (2009) reported this concentration to be about 55%. Omran et al 2008) found that the concentration percentage of the largest shareholders averaged 48% for four Arab countries.
However, La Porta et al (1999) found the concentration of ownership to be 10% in the U.S. and 20% in the UK. The sample includes 130 non financial listed firms on Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) over the period from 2009 to 2012 continuously. Tobin: Ratio of market value of a firm's equity (the firm's share price at the end of the year multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding) + total debt/the book value of total assets; ROA= This ratio is calculated as earned before interest and taxes divided by total assets; OC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by the largest shareholders who own more than 5% of the total equity; IOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions that own more than 5% to the total shares ; GOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by government that own more than 5% to the total shares ; FOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by families (individuals) that own more than 5% to the total shares; Control variables: DT: total debt divided by assets; FS: firm's size measured by total assets; FA: firm's age measured by number of years since incorporation Consistent with La Porta et al. 's argument (1997, 1998, 1999) , ownership concentration is common among large shareholders (either institutions or individuals). In addition, when the legal system does not provide sufficient protection for investors, owners maintain large positions in firms, creating ownership concentration.
Common-law countries, such as the UK and the U.S.
have the strongest legal system protections, whereas civil-law countries have the weakest. In addition, the mean percentage of institutional investors was 47%, suggesting that concentrated institutional ownership exists in most firms listed on the KSE. In contrast, the mean percentage of shares held by the government was only 3% and the percentage held by families was 7%.As for control variables, the mean value for debt was 20%, the mean value for firms' size was KD188,486 and the firms' mean age was 10.4 years. performance and composition of ownership. The F-value in both models is significant at the 1% level. In testing the first hypothesis, a negative and insignificant correlation was found between concentration of ownership and Tobin's Q. Thus, the first hypothesis is rejected. This result is consistent with that of Denis and Denis (1994) , Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , Holderness and Sheehan (1988) ,and Omran et al. (2008) , all of whom found a number of variables that explained the significant variation in the concentration of ownership concentration, i.e., firms' size, instability profit, legal system, and insider ownership. The concentration of ownership might have no effect on firms' performance due to endogeneity. The researchers in all of these studies concluded that the concentration of ownership and firms' performance are endogenous and should differ systematically by firm and industry to maximize the firms' performance and value. The sample includes 130 non financial listed firms on Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) over the period from 2009 to 2012 continuously. Tobin: Ratio of market value of a firm's equity (the firm's share price at the end of the year multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding) + total debt/the book value of total assets; ROA= This ratio is calculated as earned before interest and taxes divided by total assets; OC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by the largest shareholders who own more than 5% of the total equity; IOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions that own more than 5% to the total shares ; GOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by government that own more than 5% to the total shares ; FOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by families (individuals) that own more than 5% to the total shares; Control variables: DT: total debt divided by assets; FS: firm's size measured by total assets; FA: firm's age measured by number of years since incorporation. IN1-IN3 are the industry type based on KSE classifications (the excluded dummy variable for industry classification is the food sector). * Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. ***Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. t-statistics are in parentheses In the second model, institutional investors do not impact firms' performance in Kuwait; thus, the second hypothesis is rejected. This result does not support the monitoring hypothesis by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , who stated that they are more capable of monitoring and thus improving firms' performance even when large shareholders are not involved in management. This result can be explained by the absence of a corporate governance code for the firms that are listed on the KSE.
Results based on market measure (Tobin's Q)
In terms of government ownership, the relationship between firms' performance and the government's concentration of ownership was insignificant based on Tobin's Q. This is consistent with the research of Xu and Wang (1997) , who found that the government was ineffective in improving firms' performance. Thus, the third hypothesis is rejected. In testing the fourth hypothesis, the OLS regression showed an insignificant relationship between the concentration of ownership by families (individuals) and firms' performance based on Tobin's Q. Hence, hypothesis four is rejected as well.
This result is consistent with the finding of Denis and Denis (1994) and Omran et al. (2008) .
In terms of control variables, the debt ratio recorded in both models had an insignificant relationship based on Tobin's Q. This result means that the market perceives debt as an ineffective mechanism for controlling managers and improving firms' performance. However, firms' size and firms' age had a significant, negative relationship with firms' performance based on Tobin's Q. The results suggested that the market perceives younger and smaller Kuwaiti firms to be better performers than their older, larger counterparts. Younger, smaller firms might be creative and change more readily to enhance performance than older, larger companies. Moreover, younger, smaller firms face greater competition and thus have incentive to perform better. This is consistent with the results of Hu and Izumida (2008) , who found that firms' size was expected to have a negative impact on the concentration of ownership because of wealth limitations and risk diversification. Also, Ng et al. (2008) (Fama and Jensen, 1983) . This result is also consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Erhardt et al.(2006) , who found that family-controlled firms had greater value and operated more efficiently. The sample includes 130 non financial listed firms on Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) over the period from 2009 to 2012 continuously. Tobin: Ratio of market value of a firm's equity (the firm's share price at the end of the year multiplied by the total number of shares outstanding) + total debt/the book value of total assets; ROA= This ratio is calculated as earned before interest and taxes divided by total assets; OC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by the largest shareholders who own more than 5% of the total equity; IOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by institutions that own more than 5% to the total shares ; GOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by government that own more than 5% to the total shares ; FOC: Percentage of shares outstanding held by families (individuals) that own more than 5% to the total shares; Control variables: DT: total debt divided by assets; FS: firm's size measured by total assets; FA: firm's age measured by number of years since incorporation; IN1-IN3 are the industry type based on KSE classifications (the excluded dummy variable for industry classification is the food sector). * Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. *** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. t-statistics are in parentheses.
In terms of control variables, the results also indicated a significant, negative relationship between firms' performance based on ROA and debt. These findings supported the findings of McConnell and Servaes (1995) , who indicated that creating debt was an ineffective control mechanism. This is consistent with the finding of Ng et al. (2008) that debt was expected to have a negative association with market performance.
Also, Hu and Izumida (2008) and Perrini et al. (2008) found a negative relationship between debt and firms' performance, and they concluded that this relationship resulted from the agency cost of debt resulting from the conflicts of interest between the debtholders and the shareholders. Firms' size was insignificantly associated with ROA in both models. This result was inconsistent with agency theory. Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that agency costs are expected to increase as firms' size increases, leading to greater managerial discretion, opportunism, and monitoring. Meanwhile, firms' age was insignificantly associated with ROA in both models.
Like market performance, the results found an industry influence on firms' performance, with the real estate sector seeming to underperform (highest significant negative coefficient) other sectors.
Implication of findings
The 
